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Abstract
This study provides a comparative survey of policy‐
making discourse in the United Kingdom and the
United States from 2016 to 2020 around digital threats
to democracy. Through an inductive coding process,
it identifies six core ideals common in these two
countries: transparency, accountability, engagement,
informed public, social solidarity, and freedom of ex-
pression. Reviewing how these ideals are constructed
in policy‐making documents, we find differences in
each country's emphasis, inconsistencies in how some
democratic ideals are evoked and promoted, conflicts
between different democratic ideals, and disconnects
between empirical realities of democracy and policy‐
making discourse. There is a lack of clarity in what
social solidarity, engagement, and freedom of ex-
pression mean and how they should be balanced;
conceptions of an informed public are deeply fraught,
and in tension with other ideals. We argue that policy‐
making discourse is often out of step with the growing
literature which suggests that political conflicts be-
tween social groups, right‐wing extremism, and anti-
democratic actions increasingly taken by elites and
parties are at the root of growing democratic crises.
This state of policy‐making discourse has important
implications for attempts to pursue regulation and
suggests the need for further reflection by policy-
makers on the democratic ideals they are solving for.
KEYWORDS
democracy, public policy, regulation, technology, threat
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐NoDerivs License, which
permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no
modifications or adaptations are made.
© 2021 The Authors. Policy & Internet published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Policy Studies Organization.
INTRODUCTION
A capricious relationship exists between digital technology and democracy in public policy
discourse. In recent years, and especially in the wake of the 2016 UK European Union
Membership referendum and the US presidential election, debate has focused on networked,
digital technologies' negative impact on democracies. For example, Persily has argued that
the Internet “can be harnessed by demagogues who appeal to the worst impulses of the mob”
(2017, p. 71) and Pfetsch has asserted that the Internet reinforces “selective perceptions,
feeding filter bubbles and stimulating tribal communication” (Pfetsch, 2018, p. 64). Capturing
how many who once saw “liberation technologies” now see something far darker, Larry
Diamond argues that though “[o]nce hailed as a great force for human empowerment and
liberation, social media—and the various related digital tools that enable people to search for,
access, accumulate, and process information—have rapidly come to be regarded as a major
threat to democratic stability and human freedom” (2019, p. 20).
In addition to this wide‐ranging academic interest in technology's impact on society and
democracy over the past few years (Hindman, 2008; Kuehn & Salter, 2020; Margolis &
Resnick, 2000; McKay & Tenove, 2020; Moore, 2018; Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018),
policymakers have raised significant concerns about the Internet and democracy. Sir Julian
King, a European Commissioner, asserted the need for “every member state to assess
comprehensively the threat to their democratic processes and institutions, whether from
more traditional cyber‐attacks or from the manipulation of information” (2018). The Inter-
national Committee on Disinformation and Fake News also asserted that:
The world in which the traditional institutions of democratic government operate
is changing at an unprecedented pace; it is an urgent and critical priority for
legislatures and governments to ensure that the fundamental rights and safe-
guards of their citizens are not violated or undermined by the unchecked march
of technology. (2018)
Recognizing the growing emphasis on technological threats to democracy, in this paper
we set out to consider how policymakers understand democratic ideals in digital contexts
and the threats to them since 2016. We examine the degree of consensus found within
current policy discourse in the United Kingdom and the United States and evaluate this
against empirical political science research about threats to democracy. These two countries
have been at the forefront of attempts to diagnose technological threats (in particular in the
wake of the 2016 Brexit referendum and the US presidential election) and to propose
regulatory response (especially within the United Kingdom). Building on Dahlberg's (2011)
assertion that there are a “diversity of understandings of digital democracy being deployed
within popular commentary, research, policy‐making, and practical initiative” (p. 855), we
consider whether policymakers share a vision of desirable democratic practice and outline
different responses to the threats they perceive technology to pose.
To do so, we inductively review key policy documents and highlight variations in how
democratic ideals are articulated which, we argue, will inevitably lead to tensions or in-
consistencies when making policy responses. Reviewing references in UK and US policy
documents, we find that though in many areas there appears to be consensus about de-
sirable democratic practice, this is not uniform. Indeed, when it comes to particular demo-
cratic ideals—such as social solidarity and freedom of expression—we show that
policymakers are articulating different conceptions of democracy which have the capacity to
contradict if policy responses are simultaneously implemented. Even more, we show how
policymakers' stated ideals for digital democracy often uphold utopian standards that depart
from the empirical realities that define UK and US democracy today.
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We conclude that although policymakers have a desire to pursue regulation that will
strengthen democracy and mitigate technological threats, there is a real need in both
countries (but especially in the United States) to devote more attention to the con-
ceptualization of democracy. This needs to involve both resolving tensions between idea-
lized values and thinking more concretely about the extent to which technology is
responsible for current democratic trends so policy‐makers solve for consistent things.
Democracy and technology
Since 2016, there has been a marked shift in research orientations around the relationship
between technology and democracy. This has involved a much greater focus on the threats
posed by technology and social media to democracy, especially on epistemic grounds (see
Jamieson, 2020). It has also meant the erasure of much work focused on the possibilities of
social media and technology to further democracy, especially global movements for racial
and social justice and equality organized primarily online (e.g., Jackson et al., 2020). In the
process, much of the post‐2016 field of research on “social media and democracy”
(Kreiss, 2021) holds up a vision of democracy characterized by deliberation and rational
public debate as both a lost empirical reality and a normative ideal (Mejia et al., 2018). This
has led to research and public debate that is increasingly framed by a set of unrealistic
democratic ideals and overly focused on technology's effects on democracy. Simulta-
neously, it ignores the growing empirical evidence of group conflicts over identity, social
status, and power lying at the root of contemporary democratic crises in the United Kingdom
and the United States (see Gest, 2016).
For example, Freelon and Wells (2020) argue that since 2016 there has been a radical
shift towards a more pessimistic account focused on the threats to democracy posed by the
Internet and especially social media. Entirely new fields of research inquiry, large‐scale
funding initiatives, and organizations devoted to the study of mis‐ and disinformation, po-
larization, and propaganda launched in the wake of 2016 and have rapidly grown to pro-
minence and come to deeply influence public debate. As Freelon and Wells (2020) argue:
Our field and media consumers worldwide have in recent years become fas-
cinated and dismayed by a constellation of media genres that includes “fake
news,” “misinformation,” “disinformation,” “media manipulation,” “coordinated
inauthentic behavior,” and “propaganda.” Indeed, we argue that this con-
stellation is the defining political communication topic of our time, given the
massive media attention, reams of scholarship, and unprecedented funding
opportunities devoted to it. Of course, none of this content is entirely new, but it
is newly salient, and the digital age has changed how such messages are
created, circulated, and interpreted, as well as their potential effects. The fear
that messages of dubious provenance and truth value may subvert the “proper”
functioning of democracy (however that is understood) has motivated
governments, citizens, and scholars to try to understand and combat the
phenomenon.
These scholars capture both the range of concerns about mediated political commu-
nication since 2016 and a particular understanding of democracy defined primarily on
epistemological grounds that have dominated public discourse. Generally, researchers and
public discourse in the United Kingdom and the United States are concerned with social
media platforms, which are dominated by Facebook (and Instagram), Google (and
YouTube), and Twitter. This does not exhaust the diverse array of digital technologies that
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influence political communication and much of social life, but it does capture the general
focus of attention among researchers and the public.
Meanwhile, research has generally proceeded from a fundamental normative concern
over the mass public's capacity for reasoned public debate, deliberation, and informed
choices at the polls. This includes deep worry over the growing public distrust in knowledge‐
producing institutions such as journalism (Carlson et al., 2021; Guess et al., 2021) and
science (see Eyal, 2019); polarization or “sectarianism” that frustrates a “healthy” “market-
place of ideas” and deliberation (Finkel et al., 2020); and broadly disinformation, mis-
information, and propaganda that undermines the shared set of facts and trust the public has
(for a review, see Kreiss, 2021).
Despite this growing body of work and a long‐established tradition of analyzing the
relationship between technology and democracy within science and technology studies
(Sclove, 1998), there has been surprisingly little scrutiny of the precise democratic ideals
that technologies are seen to undermine or the tensions that might arise between them. It is
therefore often left unstated why something is problematic and what would be preferred on
democratic grounds. This ambiguity matters because, as is widely acknowledged in de-
mocratic theory, the nature and form of democracy can be conceptualized in a range of
different ways (Crick, 2002, p. 7; Sartori, 1987). This suggests that though researchers and
policymakers often discuss democracy as a self‐evident ideal (Karppinen, 2013, p. 1), they
may possess and promote different democratic goals.
In addition, there is a need to examine congruence between the concerns often found in
this body of literature on social media and democracy and empirical evidence from other
bodies of research that is not as media‐centric. In the face of vocal techno‐pessimism, a
growing body of political science research suggests the many challenges facing democracy
do not originate from digital media, but rather reflect wide societal trends such as funda-
mental political and social differences on important dimensions such as race and ethnicity,
class, religion, and morality. Accounting for this matters because “causal stories”
(Stone, 1989), or theories of what causes social problems, often lead to particular types of
policy interventions. When researchers and policy‐makers conceptualize democratic threats
in some ways and not others—for example, being concerned with epistemology over and
above racial injustice and social inequality—that leads to some policy interventions and not
others. Getting the causal story right, therefore, is key to addressing the underlying set of
problems.
For example, it is precisely social inequality and struggles for social power that many
empirically‐oriented political scientists point to as key underlying factors behind the 2016
elections that, ironically, sparked the present research concerns over things such as dis-
information and the challenge of informed citizens. For example, Sobolewska and Ford's
(2020) empirical study Brexitland shows how the United Kingdom vote on the EU Refer-
endum was a product of demographic changes and conflicts over the identity of the nation
and who should have the power within it—not social media, disinformation, or propaganda
(which they do not discuss in presenting their empirical evidence, suggesting they were not
overriding causal factors). In other words, the outcome was not about the power of disin-
formation on digital media to sway people from their true understanding of themselves as
Britons, but fundamental conflicts over national identity and power that were made manifest
and contested on social media. Such fundamental conflicts appeared and were stoked by
elites on social media, but they were not themselves caused by technology and media.
Research on the US case provides a parallel story. In Sides et al.'s (2018) Identity Crisis,
these scholars bring extensive empirical evidence to bear on understanding the determinants
of the 2016 US presidential election. They conclude that it was contested over identity and the
status and power of various social groups—not Russian or domestic disinformation—that
explained the outcome (see also Mutz, 2018). As such, the election was less about a
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substantive policy debate between two ideological sides than a clash over which groups
should hold and wield power. For example, Donald Trump's appeals to whites as whites made
white racial identity salient and linked to a clear vote choice of the Republican on the ballot
(Jardina, 2019).
These books suggest that researchers' understanding of the threats posed by technol-
ogy may uphold an idealized vision of democracy that is disconnected from empirical in-
sights citing other drivers of growing political polarization and extremism. A research agenda
that proceeded from these insights would pay greater attention to race and ethnicity, identity
appeals, social power and status, and disinformation and propaganda as a political tool,
especially of elites on the right (Freelon et al., 2020) to lower the political standing and
participation of targeted groups—concerns which are simply not well represented in the field
(Kreiss, 2021).
It is likely the research literature—and its causal stories—affects policy debate in sig-
nificant ways. To understand the nature of policy‐making discourse, in the sections below,
we analyze policymakers' conceptualization of the threat posed by technology to democracy
in the United Kingdom and the United States, focusing on consistency and the empirical
grounding of policymakers' ideals.
METHODS
To analyze policymakers' conceptions of technological threats we conducted a documentary
analysis of reports and (draft) legislation produced by the executive agencies, legislatures,
and regulators in our two cases. Mirroring a well‐established mode of policy analyses that
has previously examined the threats posed by digital technology (Tenove, 2020) and reg-
ulatory responses to digital technology (Dommett, 2020), we set out to examine the nature
and consistency of policymakers' democratic ideals and diagnosed threats. By analyzing
policymaker reports published between 2016 and 2020, our focus does not encompass
political speeches or policy announcements but rather the “official story” recorded in formal
policy documents. Extending previous work looking at one form of democratic threat
(Tenove, 2020), our investigation included reports that (a) overtly mentioned the idea of
democracy and (b) focused on digital technology. Using these parameters, we selected key
reports and created a corpus that, though not exhaustive, captures the major documents
and outputs articulating the clearest and most thorough conceptualizations of digital threats
and democratic goods (Table 1). Citations for these documents are available in Appendix A.
In selecting sources, we examined reports published by executive agencies, legislatures,
and regulators in these two countries. Recognizing policymaking to be an ecosystem of
different agencies and actors with different degrees of power, we were interested in ex-
amining the degree to which there was uniformity in understanding.
In the UK, we selected nine documents. Three came from regulators, four from parlia-
mentary committees and two from government departments. Although in the United King-
dom regulators and parliamentary committees have varying degrees of agenda‐setting
power, it is the Government that enacts legislation, creating interesting power differentials.
Collectively these documents work to analyze the challenge posed by digital technology and
propose responses, meaning that though different in format, tone, and potential influence,
each offers insight into the nature of policymaker debate. In the United States, we selected
six documents. Like the UK documents, the US documents come from actors within the
government with various levels of power, from the unilateral power of the president to make
an executive order to informative reports for the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence (SSCI).
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TABLE 1 Reports and draft legislation produced in the United Kingdom and the United States from 2016‐2020
United Kingdom
Actor type Report title Publishing agency Year In‐text citation
Regulator Digital campaigning—increasing transparency for voters Electoral Commission 2018 EC, 2018
Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns Information Commissioner's Office 2018 ICO, 2018a
Democracy disrupted? Personal information and political influence Information Commissioner's Office 2018 ICO, 2018b
Parliamentary Committee Disinformation and “fake news:” Final report. Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport Select
Committee
2019 DCMSSC, 2019
Regulating in a digital world Communications Committee 2019 CC, 2019
The resurrection of trust Democracy and Digital Technology Committee 2020 DDTC, 2020
Russia Intelligence and Security Committee of
Parliament
2020 ISC, 2020
Government Department Protecting the debate: Intimidation, influence, and information:
Government response
Cabinet Office 2019 CO, 2019




Actor type Report title Publishing agency Year In‐text citation
Regulator Proposed rulemaking on Internet ads Federal Election Commission 2018 FEC, 2018
Legislative
Committee
Russian active measure campaigns and
interference in the 2016 US election
US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2018 SSCI, 2018
The IRA and political polarization in the
united states, 2015‐2017
The Project on Computational Propaganda at the University of
Oxford and Graphika, Commissioned by the US Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence
2018 PCP, 2018
The tactics and tropes of the Internet
Research Agency
Yonder, Commissioned by the US Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence
2018 Yonder, 2018
Government Honest ads act United States Senate 2019 Honest Ads Act, 2019
Executive order on preventing online
censorship















As a note, we chose to include the Executive Order on Online Censorship even though it
was widely considered to be political posturing rather than a serious attempt at reforming
speech rules online (Wolfe, 2020). However, we believe that it is representative in terms of
capturing the type of threats from digital technologies that the contemporary Republican
party in the United States writ large has articulated, and thus must be accounted for in this
study.
Further research is necessary to analyze whether our findings are illustrative of broader
themes and tendencies in government and regulatory bodies beyond these limited cases.
We focus on these two countries because the United States is where many leading platform
companies are headquartered and, therefore, policymaking in this country is particularly
important. At the same time, as detailed above, empirical research suggests that these two
countries are facing similar democratic strains given shifting demographics and perceived
threats to white political, cultural, social, and economic power (layered through with other
forms of social differentiation and power, such as gender and class). These two countries
were the sites of the high‐profile elections that both laid bare these underlying dynamics and
shifted much public and policy discourse. Although our focus does not allow us to make
claims about the perception of threats in other democratic contexts, we believe that our
approach to analyzing public policy discourse with an eye towards clarifying democratic
values and what are fundamentally political issues made manifest on social media versus
political problems caused by media and technological change is of utmost concern. Only by
being clear about what policymakers are and should be solving for can we craft effective
responses to the threats facing democracies around the world today.
Having collected our corpus, we conducted an inductive coding process that involved
reading each report in full multiple times. Our initial intention in coding these documents was
to examine the degree of consistency across reports. To do so, we first inductively identified
key codes relating to different democratic goals. This initial coding process identified 13
democratic goods or goals1 that appeared in texts in either case (Appendix B). We explored
the degree to which different reports cited the same ideals and refined the concepts behind
the 13 categories. Documents were primarily coded by authors with expertise in that
country, but to ensure consistency we double‐coded two US documents (Federal Election
Commission [FEC], 2018; Honest Ads Act, 2019) and two UK documents (Information
Commissioners' Office [ICO], 2018a; Election Commission [EC], 2018) from authors in
different countries. There was agreement on primary themes, and minimal disagreement on
minor themes within each document (e.g., there was only one line in ICO, 2018a, that was
coded within “informed citizenry;” one coder captured that line and the other did not. Neither
found any other references beyond that single line to informed citizenry within the docu-
ment). Uncovering evidence of inconsistency in how the same ideal was articulated within
the same or different reports, we revised our analytical focus and re‐coded the documents
(Appendix C). This process led us to refine our codes to six headings that capture discrete
democratic goals,2 and to highlight different understandings of the same ideal.
Second, we identified passages that explicitly sought to diagnose the threats technology
posed. Using a combination of keyword searches (for democracy, democratic, threat) and
hand‐coding, we identified passages citing threats including foreign interference, mis-
information, manipulation, decreased trust, monopolistic power online, hate speech, and
polarization. Once again, we identified recurring themes within different reports and identi-
fied which of our six ideals was seen to be under threat.
It is important to highlight two features of our analysis. First, comparing interventions
made by policymakers in the UK and US cases, we found important differences between
these two cases. Although UK policy documents often included clear and detailed ex-
plications of democratic goals and perceived threats, such mentions were much less fre-
quent in our US documents. Where relevant references were found, these tended to focus
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on threats rather than ideals, demonstrating a significant mismatch between the two cases.
In the analysis below, we acknowledge this unevenness by presenting quotations and ex-
amples primarily from the UK case. However, it is important to note that, for each of the
categories we present, we did find at least some engagement with these ideas in both
cases.
Second, within the documents examined, we found variation in the extent to which
different ideals and threats were articulated. As our documents encompassed reports from
regulators, legislators, and central government offices this variation is by no means sur-
prising as we would expect different parts of the policy‐making environment to place em-
phasis upon goals and threats that reflect their specific purposes. Offering our findings, we
do not seek to highlight this kind of difference in emphasis. Instead, our analysis focuses
upon examples of where potentially contradictory ideals are outlined within the entire cor-
pus. We, therefore, treat our corpus as a unified whole when seeking to identify consistency
and gaps, meaning that our findings highlight factors absent from all of our sources, rather
than only one or two texts.
FINDINGS: POLICYMAKERS, DEMOCRACY, AND DIGITAL
TECHNOLOGY
Democratic ideals and digital threats to democracy






• Freedom of Expression
We discuss each in turn, highlighting how policy documents outline each ideal.
Of these six democratic ideals, policymakers conceptualize transparency and account-
ability consistently, with little or no internal conflicts and policy solutions that do not con-
tradict one another. Social solidarity, engagement, and freedom of expression have fairly
minor conflicts, mostly in different understandings of what levels of social solidarity and
engagement are desirable (such as engagement in elections vs. broader engagement in
politics). How policymakers conceive of an informed public, however, is deeply fraught. The
varying understandings of an informed public and how digital technology threatens it lead to
contradictory policy solutions, some of which may also undermine the policies solving for
other threats. Even more, these understandings are at odds with what we know about
people's political behavior.
Transparency
The idea of transparency is one of the most prominent themes in our analysis. At its most
basic level, it conveys the idea that information should be freely available within a demo-
cratic society to enable scrutiny and accountability. Policy documents, therefore, spoke of
the importance of improving “the fairness and transparency of our democracy” (EC, 2018,
p. 1) and argued that “[f]or the public to trust individuals with power there must be
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transparency” (Democracy and Digital Technology Committee [DDTC], p. 13). Reviewing
references to this idea, we found some variation in why transparency was seen to be
desirable that reflected each actors' particular objectives or goals. We found examples of
policymakers outlining the importance of transparency for public debate (DDTC), citizens'
knowledge (Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport [DCMS] Select Committee [DCMSSC]), po-
litical choice (EC), public trust (DDTC), and accountability (Communications Commit-
tee [CC]).
While differing in emphasis, we did not find policymakers advancing different under-
standings of this ideal. Instead, they appeared to promote the same vision of ideal practice:
the availability of more information. It, therefore, appears that there is a widely held belief
that democratic governance relies on open and accessible information environments,
leading policymakers of all types to promote a common ideal.
Thinking specifically about the connection between this ideal and technology, our ana-
lysis revealed a widespread perception that digital media and platforms pose a specific
threat to transparency by limiting the information available to the public. To take an indicative
example from the United Kingdom, the ICO particularly articulated this concern, asserting
that “[r]apid social and technological developments in the use of big data mean that there is
limited knowledge of—or transparency around—the ‘behind the scenes' data processing
techniques” (2019b, p. 8). Such developments were seen to be problematic because “[w]
ithout a high level of transparency and trust amongst citizens that their data is being used
appropriately, we are at risk of developing a system of voter surveillance by default” (Ibid.,
pp. 8–9).
Although less directly spelled out, the same concerns were present in the US docu-
ments. The FEC sought “to promulgate a rule that in its text and interpretation recognizes
the paramount importance of providing the public with the clearest disclosure of the payor or
sponsor of these public communications on the Internet” (2018, p. 1). Similarly, the SSCI
commissioned report “The IRA and political polarization in the united states, 2015‐2017”
stated that “Social media firms need to share valuable data about public life with the public”
(PCP, 2018, p. 40), whereas the Honest Ads Act asserted a need for “meaningful action to
ensure that laws and regulations provide the accountability and transparency that is fun-
damental to our democracy” (2019, p. 7).
Accountability
Related to transparency, but distinct from it, is the idea of democratic accountability.
Broadly, this idea is captured in the belief that “[d]emocracy requires that those who hold
power must be accountable for that power” (DDTC, 2020, p. 13). This idea was embedded
throughout our texts and though discussed in different ways (i.e. in relation to elections or
national security) the ideal was consistently articulated. We found widespread evidence of
the belief that “processes must be in place to ensure individuals and organisations are held
to account for their actions and policies” (CC, 2019, p. 3). As such, electoral integrity and
free and fair elections were commonly emphasized in statements such as: “[t]he ultimate
accountability mechanisms in a democracy are free and fair elections” (DDTC, 2020, p.13).
This line of thinking was also evident in the United States where the Honest Ads Act argued
that: “[f]ree and fair elections require both transparency and accountability…in order to make
informed political choices and hold elected officials accountable” (2019, p. 7).
The connection between accountability and technology was frequently viewed in terms of
threat. It was therefore argued that technology challenged existing systems of democratic
accountability, with the Electoral Commission (EC) raising concerns about the implications
of “new techniques for reaching voters” on “the integrity of elections and referendums”
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(2018, p. 5). Beyond elections, we also found concerns about monopolistic platform power
and the need to ensure the existence of checks and balances within the democratic system.
The DCMS Select Committee, therefore, observed that “Facebook, in particular, is unwilling
to be accountable to regulators around the world. The Government should consider the
impact of such monopolies on the political world and on democracy” (2019, p. 42).
ENGAGEMENT
In policy documents, we found repeated support for the idea that citizens should be engaged
in the democratic process and should undertake active participation. However, in contrast to
the previous two ideals discussed above, we found evidence of potentially different accounts
of this ideal with the potential to inform different (and potentially contradictory) policy
prescriptions.
These tensions focused on the type of engagement that democracy required. In many
texts, references to engagement were least controversially focused on election campaigns
and voting. The EC asserted that “our starting point is that elections depend on participa-
tion,” specifying a vision of engagement underpinned by the idea that “getting more voters to
participate in election and referendum campaigns is good for those campaigns and for
democracy itself” (2018, p. 5, 14).
Some policy documents, however, implied a wider vision of engagement, not confined to
the electoral process. The DDTC argued that “democracy is enhanced through active citi-
zens seeking to improve the society in which they live” and specifically mentioned the idea
that citizens should engage in “meaningful conversation about the future shape of society”
(2020, p. 13, 38). These calls for public debate were echoed by the Cabinet Office (CO),
which argued that “[r]obust debate is fundamental in an open democracy,” painting a vision
of participation in which individuals were engaged in regular discussion with one another
(2019, p. 5).
The significance of these differences becomes apparent when considering the perceived
threat of digital technology and appropriate policy responses, as well as their normative
basis. For those focused on electoral engagement, technology was seen to pose a particular
threat to citizens' ability to exercise political choice without being “unduly influenced” (ICO,
2019a, p. 4) and was seen to violate privacy in ways that “could lead to disengagement with
the political process” (ICO, 2019b, p. 12). Others focused on the internet's tendency to
amplify “abuse and intimidation” towards candidates and voters and identified a need to
tackle these challenges to the electoral process (DCMSSC, 2019, p. 5).
For those bodies focused on more expansive notions of engagement, the threat posed
by technology was broader in nature and required the promotion of a different kind of
ongoing engagement. In the US, for example, the Project on Computational Propaganda
and Graphika (PCP) argued that “[s]ocial media have gone from being the natural infra-
structure for sharing collective grievances and coordinating civic engagement, to being a
computational tool for social control…” (2018, p. 40, emphasis added). The very infra-
structure of digital technology was, therefore, seen to be in potential contradiction with the
ideal of engagement, suggesting the need for significant technological reform. Similarly in
the United Kingdom, the DDTC argued that it was democratically problematic that platforms
“can, purposefully or not, change whose voice is heard” and “manipulate the flow of political
debate,” leading to proposals designed to “protect free and open debate online” (2020;
p. 9; 6).
It is important to recognize that reforms can be prescribed at both levels, but we argue
that tensions could conceivably emerge if these goals are pursued simultaneously. Al-
though, for some, reforms focused on elections and electoral participation may be sufficient,
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for others, a more fundamental form of change is required to promote engagement. Even
more, as we contend in the discussion, things such as “sharing collective grievances” can
also shade into “abuse and intimidation,” making reforms potentially more problematic given
that engagement can be directed toward antidemocratic ends.
Informed public
The ideal of an informed public suggests that citizens are informed members of a democratic
society. Our analysis found different accounts of how this ideal was envisioned that have the
potential to contradict, specifically revealing different notions of why citizens need to be
informed and what kinds of information they should possess.
First, regarding why citizens need to be informed, we found some documents empha-
sizing information about elections, whereas others idealized a public broadly informed on all
matters of public importance. A number suggested that “[i]t is a sign of a healthy democracy
when campaigners tell voters about their policies and political views,” and that “voters are
better able to exercise their right to vote in a meaningful and informed way” (EC, 2018, p. 5;
4). These ideas suggested the need for citizens to understand electoral choices to play an
active part in democracy. Other documents, however, looked beyond elections to suggest
that information was required to ensure “informed debate” (CO, 2019, p. 5). These suggest
potentially different foci for ideal practice that could lead to different prescriptions.
Second, we found different accounts of solutions to these problems, including what kind
of information citizens need. A small number of texts advanced the idea that citizens should
have “good” information and that misinformation undermined “thriving democratic debate” by
reducing “faith in democracy, trust in politicians and people's drive to participate” (DDTC,
2020, p. 26; 16; see also DCMSSC, 2019, p. 5–6). Similarly, in the United States, The IRA,
Social Media, and Polarization in the United States report calls out the spread of “junk
political news and misinformation to voters across the political spectrum” on social media
which seeks to “manipulate and deceive the voting public—and to undermine democracies
and degrade public life” (PCP, 2018, p. 39). The report further states that “a strong de-
mocracy requires high‐quality news from an independent media, a pluralistic climate of
opinion, and the ability to negotiate public consensus,” encoding a set of values of quality,
independent information sources, pluralism, and consensus‐building (PCP, 2018, p. 39).
In other documents, we found an emphasis placed on a set of skills required by citizens
to be able to navigate the information landscape (DCMSSC, 2019, p. 85; DDTC, 2020,
p. 107; DCMS, 2019, p. 89). Such statements suggest the importance of “civic compe-
tencies” and place emphasis not on preventing bad information, but on equipping citizens
with the skills necessary to discriminate between information sources.
The DDTC, for example, sees the threat of digital technology as associated with its
impact on expectations of citizens, calling for “a new, digital imperative on existing debates
around civic education” (DDTC, 2020, p. 17.). The DCMS Committee argued that the In-
ternet poses particular challenges to citizens' understanding because “[i]t is hard to differ-
entiate on social media between content that is true, that is misleading, or that is false,
especially when those messages are targeted at an individual level” (2019, p. 85).
These two accounts (bad information vs. civic competencies) present different visions of
citizens and how information should be structured within democracies and different calls to
action. When looking at the threats these documents diagnose, we see different types of
concerns and calls for action.
Although it is not impossible to pursue reforms that focus on informing citizens about
electoral and nonelectoral matters, and that seek to mitigate bad information and equip
citizens with critical literacy skills themselves, there is also potential for these ideals to stand
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at tension because they advance subtly different ideas about citizens' role in the democratic
process and their required competencies. Even more, some more expansive visions require
structural changes in the public sphere, such as promoting the public's right to hear high‐
quality news and pluralistic opinion, whereas others would require better information or
combatting misinformation.
Social solidarity
The ideal of social solidarity is a desire for an inclusive democratic practice where there are
strong communal bonds and engagement among diverse communities, a contrast to political
polarization and social division.
Within our documents, we encountered the idea that, for some bodies, democracy re-
quired constructive engagement between people with diverse views. Although this is related
to the idea of an informed public detailed above, we address it separately here because we
see the underlying concern as fragmentation. For example, there was the idea that “[i]n a
democracy, we need to experience a plurality of voices and, critically, to have the skills,
experience, and knowledge to gauge the veracity of those voices” (DCMSSC, 2019, p. 6).
This focus is on encountering different ideas and critically evaluating them. From a solidarity
perspective, there is a concern that such things as echo chambers undermine democratic
solidarity. The ICO, therefore, reflected on a particular threat posed by technology whereby:
Messages are often received in an “echo chamber” online, where voters may not
hear the other side of the argument. Voters may not understand why they are
receiving particular messages, or the provenance of the messages. (2019b,
pp. 10–11)
Somewhat differently, social solidarity was articulated in calls for “an inclusive debate”
(DDTC, 2020, p. 13). This accorded with the idea that “tolerance of conflicting views and
ideas are core facets of our democracy” (DCMS, 2020, p. 24). In practice, this meant that
“different voices, views, and opinions” should be able to “freely and peacefully contribute to
public discourse” with harmful behavior discouraged (DCMS, 2019, p. 22, 6). This is not
simply confined to elections but spans a potentially ongoing process of democratic
engagement.
Noting these nuanced differences, we found considerable attention given to the threat
digital technology poses to social solidarity. In the United Kingdom, the DCMS select
committee argued:
We have always experienced propaganda and politically aligned bias, which
purports to be news, but this activity has taken on new forms and has been
hugely magnified by information technology and the ubiquity of social media…
This has a polarising effect and reduces the common ground on which reasoned
debate, based on objective facts, can take place. (2019, p. 5)
Similarly, in the United States, the Honest Ads Act argued that social media are enabling
political advertisements that are “racially or socially Inflammatory,” serving to polarize and
create animosity among different communities. Other US documents raised the concern of
polarization not through technological bubbles (i.e., the echo chambers that have little
empirical support, see Guess et al., 2018), but from strategic messages made possible
through digital media that are designed to inflame and incite animus among political and
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social groups, such as “encouraging extreme right‐wing voters to be more confrontational”
(PCP, 2020, p.3).
Freedom of expression
Finally, there was a desire to promote freedom of expression, suggesting the need for
people to be able to express their views and opinions without undue restrictions or con-
straints. It was common for UK policymakers to assert that “openness should be an essential
quality of the Internet and we believe that it should be a fundamental principle for regulation
(including self‐regulation). This is vital as the Internet enables users to engage with de-
mocratic debate and exercise their rights to freedom of expression and information” (CC,
2019, p. 44). In contrast to many of the values above, policy documents focused not on
promoting a certain form of free expression, but rather protecting this value from being
eroded. We did not, therefore, find evidence of contradictory understandings of this idea, but
we did find variations in policymakers' understanding of how this value should be balanced
alongside the other concerns identified above.
Within the United Kingdom, we found freedom of expression commonly discussed as
one value that needed to be considered alongside many other concerns—a balancing ap-
proach. For the Communication Committee, the principle of “[r]espect for human rights and
equality: to safeguard the freedoms of expression and information online” (CC, 2019, p. 4)
was therefore presented as one of 10 values alongside ideas such as transparency, edu-
cation, and privacy. Similarly, the Online Harms White paper outlined a vision with eight
goals, including freedom of expression alongside others (DCMS, 2019, p. 6). The precise
way in which policymakers aimed to reconcile these potentially contradictory goals was,
however, unspecified, making it unclear how exactly these values will be reconciled.
In the United States, there was a different approach to freedom of expression that
elevated it above other ideals. Discussing regulation, the FEC highlighted the concern that
interventions would create a “burden on political speech” (2018, p. 2). Similarly, the Trump
administration argued that social media firms' “censorship” (meaning removal of content or
labeling of content) chills free expression and limits information, asserting: “…we cannot
allow a limited number of online platforms to handpick the speech that Americans may
access and convey on the Internet. When large, powerful social media companies censor
opinions with which they disagree, they exercise a dangerous power” (The White House,
2020, p. 1).
The threat posed by digital technology also differed in our two cases. In the United
Kingdom, policymakers asserted that “[a]s the Internet plays a greater role in private and
public life, human rights, including the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of
information, need to be protected online” (CC, 2019, p. 18). From this perspective regulators
needed to balance freedom of expression against other values, such as safety and equality.
Although there was a concern that “platforms' decisions about what content they remove or
stop promoting through their algorithms set the de facto limits of free expression online”
(DDTC, 2020, p. 6–7), there was also the acknowledged need to protect safety. In the United
States, there was simultaneously the primacy of freedom of expression which required
limited governmental intervention, while also ironically a critique of private companies as-
serting their freedom of expression in moderating content on their platforms in ways that
might “censor” political views. As such, in the US case, the policy implications of the value of
freedom of expression are simply unclear and deeply contested (see Klonick, 2017;
Kosseff, 2019).
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DISCUSSION
Since 2016, research in the United Kingdom and the United States has shifted to emphasize
the democratic ills of technology. As this article demonstrates, policy‐making discourse
reflects this emphasis and often encodes democratic values in ways that are not always
clear. This manifests a growing divergence from empirical studies on the drivers of demo-
cratic issues. At the same time, there are important differences between the two countries.
To start, our analysis shows interesting differences in how policymakers in the United
Kingdom and the United States talk about the impact of technology on democracy. Although
the idea of technological “threats” is often raised, it is primarily in the UK case that we find
policymakers clearly articulating the democratic values they are seeking to promote—
beyond freedom of expression in the US case. To develop our analysis, we turn to discuss
the degree of consistency within policy‐making discourse, asking what policymakers are
solving for and whether their approach is likely to result in successful regulation from the
perspective of strengthening democracy. Considering these questions, we highlight three
broad themes that spotlight:
1. Inconsistencies in how specific values are understood and promoted;
2. Tensions between different values; and,
3. A lack of congruence between ideal practices and empirical insights on how democracy
works in practice.
To start, the analysis above demonstrated important variations in how certain democratic
ideals and objectives are understood. Although there was a degree of consistency in how the
values of transparency and accountability were depicted, there were different depictions of
social solidarity, engagement, freedom of expression, and informed public. In particular, the
latter value revealed different understandings of why citizens needed to be informed, what kinds
of information they should possess, and what structural media conditions should supply it. At the
core of these different ideas lie seemingly different assumptions about the role of citizens within
a democracy (i.e., voting and/or debating) and their competencies (consuming good quality
information or navigating public life or complex information landscapes). Importantly these in-
consistencies are found not only across different documents (suggesting the presence of dif-
ferent visions among different actors with varying amounts of power) but also within single
documents. Although there is potential for these ideas to be reconciled (citizens can after all
both vote and take part in debate) at present it is not clear how different objectives fit together,
whether policymakers are promoting a consistent and compatible vision of democratic politics,
which principles should prevail, and accordingly what regulatory priorities should be.
We also identify similar challenges arising between values. As discussed above in iso-
lation, there are clear connections between these different principles and potential challenges
arising from the simultaneous pursuit of these ideals. In relation to freedom of expression, for
example, with the United Kingdom, there is evidence of a tension between this principle and
desires for social solidarity and “an inclusive debate” in which harmful behavior is discouraged
(DDTC, 2020, p. 13). Similarly, there is potential dissonance between freedom of expression
and a desire for good quality information that informs citizens, as individuals could (and
frequently do) claim the right to promote views that are not accurate or attempt to deliberately
mislead. Indeed, a vast amount of empirical evidence suggests this is precisely the case,
especially in the context of how political actors use disinformation strategically for political
gain, or voters share information to signal and strengthen social affiliations, not inform or
persuade (Freelon et al., 2020; Polletta & Callahan, 2019).
At present, policy documents engage with these potential tensions to a limited extent,
tending instead to outline lists of values that are presented as informative but often
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contradictory. This approach allows for considerable ambiguity about how such tensions are
to be resolved, opening the door for potentially different interpretations of what desirable
democratic practice looks like. It could, for example, be that policymakers in one part of
government prioritize the mitigation of harm when determining policy and, as such, move to
curtail certain forms of expression online, whereas others prioritize freedom of expression
and hence rebuff attempts at regulation, in the process increasing the likelihood of disin-
formation and harms. Although we recognize the varying capacity of these actors to enact
their visions, these findings point to the potential for policymakers to operationalize ideals in
different ways, creating potentially contradictory responses if common understandings and
priorities are not developed and ascribed to across policy‐making domains. Although further
study of a larger corpus and other democratic contexts would be necessary to test and
extend these insights, we argue that these initial findings are important.
The implications of our initial analysis suggest that there may be ambiguities in what pol-
icymakers are solving, a point that has consequences for determining regulatory responses as it
may lead to inconsistent interventions. And yet, this is not the only challenge we discern within
our analysis. In highlighting different visions of democracy, our analysis has shown policy-
makers to often be promoting utopian conceptions of citizen behavior that existing empirical
research suggests do not reflect actual practice. For those idealizing an informed citizenry and
electoral participation, there is little recognition that even before the social media era many
citizens failed to vote and lacked the time or inclination to become informed on arcane political
matters (Achen & Bartels, 2017). Similarly, there is minimal recognition that citizens are often
uninformed and that they rely on heuristics, such as identity cues, rather than ‘good information'
when they exercise political choice (see Bernhard & Freeder, 2020). Those pointing to the
importance of political debate often do not recognize that debate is often uncivil (Sydnor, 2019),
and occurs for idiosyncratic reasons (as opposed to between knowledgeable and politically
similar discussants (Minozzi et al., 2020)). Discussions of engagement and cross‐cutting ex-
posure to political views often overlook evidence that it can lead to polarization when citizens
have competing goals, identities (Bail, 2021; Finkel et al., 2020), and values (Tappin &
McCay, 2019). Even more, engagement, like expression, can have expressly anti‐democratic
ends (Miller‐Idriss, 2019). In essence, discussions of desirable practice in the online world that
appear to be divorced from the empirical realities of the offline world.
This raises a larger question about the democratic expectations policy‐makers place on
digital media and the degree to which technology is seen to undermine ideals that empirical
evidence suggests have not been thriving long before digital technology came along. Our point
here is not to condemn policymakers for striving to promote utopian democratic ideals, but
rather to question the extent to which digital technology is seen as the driver of trends that have
deeper, more longstanding, and social and institutional roots. As Jungherr and Schroeder's
study of disinformation argued, and which our own study supports, there appears to be a danger
that a focus on digital threats shifts attention away from “deeper drivers of social change and
thereby obscures the actual reasons for the contemporary sense of epistemic crisis” (2021,
p. 2). And, to the extent that resources and thinking are directed away from these deeper
causes, it means that countries are not solving for underlying social inequalities that fuel rising
extremism and undemocratic actions—which receive scant mention in any of these documents.
Finally, we will add that although there has been greater attention to the growing threat of
right‐wing extremism over the past year in the United States, especially after the January 6th
attempted coup at the US Capitol, policy‐making responses are still consumed by as-
sumptions of clear and present technological threats to democracy. This is evidenced by the
25 separate bills to reform Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act introduced in
March 2020 to solve various issues ranging from “dangerous algorithms” and disinformation
to online censorship (Jeevanjee et al., 2021), bills that themselves reveal fundamental
tensions between things such as freedom of expression and informed citizens.
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CONCLUSION
In the end, it is clear there is a need for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic to more
concertedly consider the relationship between democracy and technology. As our case
studies show, there has been a flurry of interest in this topic and, in the United Kingdom in
particular, there is a desire to enact regulation to “set the global standard for a risk‐based,
proportionate regulatory framework” (DCMS, 2020, p. 4). Although our analysis has de-
monstrated there to be a degree of consistency in the values and ideals that policymakers
are promoting and seeking to protect, we have also revealed areas of inconsistency and
tension that, if left unresolved, have the potential to result in regulatory complexities. In
addition, there is a concerning degree to which the realities of democratic life often lack
congruence with high‐minded democratic ideals. This means that, at best, policy interven-
tions might be ineffective at solving the democratic ills they are designed for; at worst, they
might make them worse. For this reason, we argue there is a need for policymakers, par-
ticularly in the United States, but also in the United Kingdom, to think about their visions for
democracy and its realities in more detail. This entails determining what they are solving for
and why and ensuring that a common or, at the very least, a compatible set of ideals are
advanced by actors across the policy‐making landscape. It also suggests a need to review
desires against empirical realities, and to reflect on whether new (and potentially unrealiz-
able standards) are being set for the online world.
ENDNOTES
1The initial codes identified were: Procedural fairness; Accountability; Transparency; Active Participation; Informed
Citizenry; Anti‐Dis‐ or Misinformation or deception; Anti‐Polarization; Freedom of Expression; National Sovereignty
(i.e., anti‐foreign Interference); Protecting Privacy; Trust and Confidence; Preventing harm; Economic prosperity
and opportunity.
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Documents examined for UK case:
Regulators
• Electoral Commission. (2018). Digital Campaigning—Increasing Transparency for Vo-
ters, London: Stationary Office. https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/
pdf_file/0010/244594/Digital-campaigning-improving-transparency-for-voters.pdf
• Information Commissioners' Office. (2018, November). Investigation into the use of data
analytics in political campaigns. London: Stationary Office. https://ico.org.uk/media/
action-weve-taken/2260271/investigation-into-the-use-of-data-analytics-in-political-
campaigns-final-20181105.pdf
• Information Commissioners' Office. (2018). Democracy disrupted? Personal information
and political influence. London: Stationary Office. https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-
taken/2259369/democracy-disrupted-110718.pdf
Parliament
• Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee. (2019). Disinformation and ‘fake
news': Final Report: Fifth Report of Session 2017–19. London: Stationary Office. https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf
• Democracy and Digital Technology Committee ‘The Resurrection of Trust.' https://
committees.parliament.uk/publications/1634/documents/17731/default/
• Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament—Intelligence and Security Committee
of Parliament. https://docs.google.com/a/independent.gov.uk/viewer?a=v%26pid=sites%
26srcid=aW5kZXBlbmRlbnQuZ292LnVrfGlzY3xneDo1Y2RhMGEyN2Y3NjM0OWFl
• Digital Communications Committee. (2019). Regulating in a Digital World. https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldcomuni/299/299.pdf
Government
• Cabinet Office. (2019). Protecting the Debate: Intimidation, Influence and Information:
Government Response. London: Stationary Office. https://www.gov.uk/government/
consultations/protecting-the-debate-intimidation-influence-and-information
• DCMS. (2019). Online Harms White Paper. London: Stationary Office. https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
793360/Online_Harms_White_Paper.pdf
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Documents examined for the US case:
Regulators
• Executive Office of the President. E.O. 13925 of May 28, 2020. Preventing online cen-
sorship. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/06/02/2020-12030/preventing-
online-censorship
• 116th United States Congress. 2019–2020. S. 1356—Honest Ads Act. https://www.
congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1356/text
• Federal Election Commission. (2018). 83 FR 12864. Notice of proposed rulemaking:
Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of “Public Communication.” https://
sers.fec.gov/fosers/rulemaking.htm?pid=74739
Senate reports
• Senate Intelligence (Select) Committee. S. Rpt. 116–290. Russian Active Measures
Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US election. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
• Yonder (previously New Knowledge). (2018). The Tactics and Tropes of the Internet
Research Agency. Independent report commissioned by the US Senate Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence. https://www.yonder-ai.com/resources/the-disinformation-report/
• The IRA and Political Polarization in the United States, 2015–2017. (2018). The Project
on Computational Propaganda and Graphika. Independent report commissioned by the
US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/
the-ira-and-political-polarization-in-the-united-states/
APPENDIX B: Init ial coding framework developed through inductive
analysis
Code Description Examples
Procedural Fairness A concern with fair process and the
rule of a democracy that is “free
and fair elections”
The Electoral Commission oversees the
delivery of elections and is the
regulator of political finance in the UK.
We work to ensure that parties and
campaigners understand and comply
with the laws about elections. We
investigate where offences may have
been committed. We also make
recommendations about how to
improve the fairness and transparency
of our democracy
Accountability Often linked to transparency, but can
be evoked as a separate ideal.
Speaks to the idea that there
should be processes for holding
powerful actors to account.
Evident in passages calling for
sanctions and mechanisms for
disincentivizing poor practice.
We are worried that a maximum fine of
£20,000 risks becoming a cost of
doing business for some
campaigners. This penalty does not
provide an effective deterrent to stop
campaigners committing offences
Technology is not a force of nature. Online
platforms are not inherently
ungovernable. They can and should
be bound by the same restraints that
we apply to the rest of society
(Continues)
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Code Description Examples
Transparency Information being visible or available—
either to regulators or the public.
Parliamentarians, journalists, civil society
and citizens have woken up to the fact
that transparency is the cornerstone of
democracy
Active Participation Citizens being active in a democracy.
Focus on participation and
political engagement
Democracy is enhanced through active
citizens seeking to improve the society
in which they live. In Chapter 7, we
look at how education can empower
citizens to make a difference to their
lives in a digital world’
On digital campaigning, our starting point
is that elections depend on
participation
Informed Citizenry Citizens educated/informed about
how things work. They are
provided with information and are
able to make informed choices.
There is a link to concern here
about mis/disinformation, but this
code captures positive examples
of having information as opposed
to deception/misinformation
captured in another code.
This is a complex and rapidly evolving
area of activity, and the level of
awareness amongst the public about
how data analytics works and how
their personal information is collected,
shared and used through such tools
is low
Citizens can only make truly informed
choices about who to vote for if they




Tied to “informed citizenry,” but
focuses more explicitly on the
need to counter di‐s and
misinformation and the threat of
misleading information.
More recently we have seen serious
allegations of misinformation, misuse
of personal data, and overseas
interference. Concerns that our
democracy may be under threat have
emerged
While the Internet has brought many
freedoms across the world and an
unprecedented ability to
communicate, it also carries the
insidious ability to distort, to mislead
and to produce hatred and instability.
Anti‐polarization The Internet can lead to
fragmentation and polarization.
Citizens need to encounter a
diverse range of voices and
perspectives so polarization is
bad. Filter bubbles, segmented
messaging (and microtargeting)
are often seen to be bad.
The tolerance of conflicting views and
ideas are core facets of our
democracy
We can also further improve our
democracy by using technology




Citizens have the freedom to express
their ideas without interference.
Free expression or free speech.
Our vision is for…Freedom of expression
online.
This abuse is unacceptable—it goes
beyond free speech and free debate,
dissuades good people from going
into public life, and corrodes the
values on which our democracy rests
(Continues)





National sovereignty key. Foreign
interference should not be
allowed. Self‐determination
paramount. Often explicit
mentions of Russia as a source of
disinformation
GCHQ assesses that Russia is a highly
capable cyber actor with a proven
capability to carry out operations
which can deliver a range of impacts
across any sector
Our vision is for…An online environment
where companies take effective steps
to keep their users safe, and where
criminal, terrorist and hostile foreign
state activity is not left to contaminate
the online space
Protecting Privacy Often linked to data rights. Primacy of
individual or group privacy. Desire
to protect individual privacy and to
promote privacy‐preserving
practices among actors within a
democracy (e.g., parties).
Concerns about data misuse
We have uncovered a disturbing
disregard for voters’ personal privacy.
Social media platforms, political
parties, data brokers and credit
reference agencies have started to
question their own processes—
sending ripples through the big data
eco‐system’
Trust and Confidence Trust and confidence are seen as key
to democratic engagement
we believe that the digital economy
urgently needs a new regulatory
framework to improve our citizens’
safety online. This will rebuild public
confidence and set clear expectations
of companies, allowing our citizens to
enjoy more safely the benefits that
online services offer
Developing a culture of transparency,
trust and accountability will be a
critical element of the new regulatory
framework
Preventing Harm Harm is defined in many forms seen
to have a negative impact on
society. Often linked to abuse
online, bullying, or other forms of
crime enabled by the Internet.
Linked to online safety and illegal
content
This Government is committed to
ensuring that everyone—candidates,
campaigners and voters—can
participate in our democracy free from
abuse and intimidation
There are widespread concerns about the
role of social media in spreading hate





Digital is seen to be valuable for
economic prosperity but also seen
to threaten the economy if not
handled properly.
The Internet has transformed and
disrupted economies thanks to rapid
innovation enabled by light‐touch
regulation and a corporate culture
which espoused the mantra “move
fast and break things”
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Code Description Example
Transparency Information being visible or available—either
to regulators or the public.
Without a high level of transparency and
trust amongst citizens that their data
is being used appropriately, we are at
risk of developing a system of voter
surveillance by default.
Accountability Often linked to transparency, but can be
evoked as a separate ideal. Speaks to
the idea that there should be processes
for holding powerful actors to account.
Evident in passages calling for sanctions
and mechanisms for disincentivizing poor
practice.
Democracy requires that those who hold
power must be accountable for that
power.
Engagement Citizens being engaged in democracy. Often
linked to the idea of active participation,
but can be evident in more passive forms
of citizen attention and awareness.
Democracy is enhanced through active
citizens seeking to improve the
society in which they live.
Informed Public Citizens educated/informed about how
things work and who messages are from.
They are provided with information and
are able to make informed choices. Mis/
disinformation seen to undermine this
objective.
It is a sign of a healthy democracy when
campaigners tell voters about their
policies and political views.
Social Solidarity Citizens are not isolated individuals but
encounter a diverse range of voices and
perspectives. Emphasis on community
and social ties. In contrast to
fragmentation and polarization. Focus on
the minimization of harm.
Messages are often received in an ‘echo
chamber’ online, where voters may
not hear the other side of the
argument. Voters may not understand
why they are receiving particular




Citizens have the freedom to express their
ideas without interference. Free
expression or free speech.
Respect for human rights and equality: to
safeguard the freedoms of
expression and information online.
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